Brexit and the British Bill of Rights by Lock, Tobias, [Unknown] et al.
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2913566 
 
 
 
 
 
Brexit and the 
British Bill of Rights 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A research paper edited by 
Tobias Lock and Tom Gerald Daly 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2913566 
 
 
 
 
Brexit and the British Bill of Rights 
 
 
This research paper originated in a workshop held at Edinburgh Law School on 
27 October 2016 and is based on oral presentations and contributions to the 
discussion by: 
 
Dr Ed Bates, Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Leicester 
Professor Christine Bell, Professor of Constitutional Law, Assistant Principal (Global Justice), 
Director of the Global Justice Academy, University of Edinburgh 
Dr Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Liverpool 
Professor Sir David Edward QC, former judge at the Court of Justice of the EU and member 
of the Bill of Rights Commission 
Murray Hunt, Legal Adviser to the Joint Committee on Human Rights 
Dr Dimitrios Kagiaros, Teaching Fellow in Public Law and Human Rights Law, University of 
Edinburgh 
Dr Tobias Lock, Senior Lecturer in EU Law, co-director of the Europa Institute, University of 
Edinburgh 
Professor Fiona de Londras, Professor of Global Legal Studies, University of Birmingham 
Dr Cormac MacAmhlaigh, Senior Lecturer, Edinburgh Law School 
Professor Christopher McCrudden, Professor of Human Rights and Equality Law, Queen's 
University Belfast 
Dr Anne Smith, Lecturer, University of Ulster, Transitional Justice Institute 
Representatives from the human rights bodies: John Corey (NIHRC); Kavita Chetty (SHRC); 
and Maire McCormack (CYPCS) 
 
Workshop organisers and funders: 
 
The Europa Institute and the Global Justice Academy of the University of Edinburgh, the 
Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law, and the Human Rights Centre at Queen’s University 
Belfast. Generously supported by the Thomas Paine Initiative. 
 
Edited by: 
 
Dr Tobias Lock, University of Edinburgh 
(tobias.lock@ed.ac.uk)  
Dr Tom Gerald Daly, University of Edinburgh 
(tom.daly@ed.ac.uk)  
 
 
Contents 
 
 
 
Executive summary 5 
   
Foreword by the editors 8 
   
General introduction 10 
   
Part I 
Concrete reduction in rights protection 
 
 Introduction 12 
 1. Loss of rights contained in EU law 12 
 2. Potential mitigation of Brexit-related rights reduction 13 
 3. Fresh impetus to a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland: A silver lining? 14 
 4. The ‘forgotten’ all-Ireland charter of rights 16 
 5. The potential and pitfalls of a British Bill of Rights 
 
16 
 
Part II 
Consent 
 
 Introduction 19 
 1. Existing litigation concerning consent 19 
  1.1 The London litigation: R (Miller) v Secretary of State for 
Exiting the European Union 
20 
  1.2 The Belfast litigation 21 
 2. Consent of the Scottish Parliament 23 
 3. The EU law dimension to consent 24 
 4. Consent of the Republic of Ireland under the Good Friday Agreement 24 
  4.1 Consent of the government and people of the Republic of 
Ireland 
24 
  4.2 The Good Friday Agreement and EU law 25 
Part III 
Constitutional complexity 
 
 Introduction 27 
 1. Constitutional ignorance 27 
 2. Misconceptions underlying plans to ‘free’ the UK from the European 
Court of Human Rights through a BBR 
28 
 
 
 3. Additional government proposals 29 
  3.1 Government proposals regarding extradition and deportation 29 
  3.2 Government proposals to restrict extraterritorial application 
of ECHR to military activities 
29 
 4. Implications of Brexit and these specific government proposals 31 
 5. Other significant questions raised at the Workshop 
 
32 
 
Part IV 
Community 
 
 Introduction 35 
 1. Brexit and the wider context of EU Member States 35 
 2. The wider implications of withdrawal from the ECHR on the UK’s 
neighbours 
35 
 3. Conclusion 36 
 5 
 
Executive Summary 
 
 
The aim of this research paper is to explain the mechanism and consequences 
of the United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union (‘Brexit’) and the plan 
to establish a British Bill of Rights. 
 
The key points of the research paper are: 
 
 The issue of consent regarding the initiation of Article 50 of the Treaty on European 
Union (TEU) to formally trigger the Brexit process under EU law is highly complex, 
relating to five cross-cutting dimensions:  
(i) the involvement of the UK Parliament in the Brexit negotiations;  
(ii) the consent of the Northern Ireland Assembly to Brexit;  
(iii) the consent of the Scottish Parliament;  
(iv) the need for unanimous agreement by all EU Member States should the UK 
wish to reverse the triggering of Article 50; and  
(v) the possible need to obtain the consent of the Republic of Ireland to Brexit as 
a fundamental alteration of the Good Friday Agreement. 
 Brexit presents a clear reduction in formal protection of fundamental rights in the UK 
through discontinued application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and 
Freedoms; 
 Whether this reduction in rights protection can be addressed by other measures at 
the national level, particularly the inclusion of ‘lost’ EU Charter rights in a British Bill 
of Rights, is questionable; 
 Brexit, a BBR, and other related policy pledges seeking to reduce the application of 
international human rights law to UK actors, taken within the current context and 
their likely consequences, represent a weakening of the human rights protection 
framework as a whole – a certain ‘disentrenchment’ of human rights, reversing the 
decades-long trend toward incremental expansion in the right protection afforded to 
individuals across the UK. 
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 Various existing government policy proposals aimed at ‘freeing’ the UK from 
intervention of the European Court of Human Rights appear to be rooted in 
misconceptions concerning the nature of the ECHR and international human rights 
law more generally.  
 Regarding plans to repeal the Human Rights Act (HRA) and its replacement by a 
British Bill of Rights (BBR), this would not free the UK from its obligations to comply 
with the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in cases where the UK is 
a respondent party. In fact, it might lead to an increase in the number of successful 
applications to the Strasbourg Court, diminish the possibility for meaningful dialogue 
between the Strasbourg Court and the British courts, and thereby amplify rather 
than lessen the impact of Strasbourg case-law. The only viable way to remove such 
obligations is for the UK to denounce (leave) the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR). 
 Repeal of the HRA, its replacement with a BBR, and other related policy pledges 
seeking to reduce the application of international human rights law to UK actors, all 
ultimately appear to set a path toward withdrawal from the ECHR.  
 In this connection, it was noted that UK withdrawal from the ECHR system would be 
likely to lead to withdrawal from the Council of Europe, which would significantly 
undermine the UK’s reputation as a state that cares about human rights protection. 
The UK would be only the second country in Europe which is not a member of the 
Council of Europe; the other being Belarus with its very problematic human rights 
record. 
 Withdrawal by the UK would represent the first time a long-established Western 
democracy has left a major international human rights regime. Such a move would 
place the UK in the company of Greece under military rule in December 1969, when 
it left the ECHR system and Council of Europe, or more recently, Venezuela under 
Hugo Chávez, which denounced the American Convention on Human Rights in 2012 
in order to leave the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 
 Brexit poses real threats to the fragile peace in Northern Ireland, given that EU 
membership is central to the Good Friday Agreement, and given that EU law is 
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dominant in areas that are clear ‘flash points’ for discord between the parties in the 
consociational government, such as equality legislation. 
 Plans for repeal of the HRA, its replacement by a BBR, and other related policy 
pledges, pose threats not only to rights protection in the UK, but also to the rights 
protection (albeit limited) provided by the ECHR system in other states of the Council 
of Europe, given that UK withdrawal from the ECHR would be likely to trigger 
withdrawal by other states, such as Russia and Azerbaijan.  
 The most fundamental conclusion from the workshop is that the current 
governmental approach to Brexit and a British Bill of Rights does not adequately 
appreciate, or address, the extraordinary complexity of human rights protection in 
the UK, which enmeshes protections across the international, EU, State, devolved, 
and bilateral planes. Until, and unless, policy formation begins to fully grapple with 
this complexity, serious rule of law and legitimacy questions will hang over the 
solutions presented by the Conservative government to the current constitutional 
entanglement. 
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Foreword by the editors 
 
 
The Conservative Party manifesto of 20151 contained two key policy pledges: the holding of 
a referendum on the UK’s continued membership of the European Union (EU);2 and a plan 
to repeal the Human Rights Act 1998 and replace it with a British Bill of Rights.3 The 
Conservative government elected in the general election of 7 May 2015 has delivered on the 
first pledge, although the consequences of the referendum result, supporting the UK’s exit 
from the EU (‘Brexit’) is far from clear. The government has not yet pursued the second 
pledge with the same vigour, but it remains a central plank of the platform for government. 
This research paper provides an overview of a number of key legal questions raised by the 
Conservative government’s plans, emphasising the complexity involved; a complexity which 
tends to be elided in current government policy formation. The paper is intentionally 
succinct and does not claim to be exhaustive. 
 
Detailed policy and academic discussions have of course already taken place, and continue 
to take place, concerning the legal and political complexities and uncertainties surrounding 
Brexit, since the results of the referendum vote were announced on 24 June 2016. However, 
despite this, discussion has often failed to capture the full extent of this complexity. In 
addition, the plan for a British Bill of Rights (BBR) has been eclipsed by Brexit. Yet, as this 
report reveals, the two developments are closely linked and the BBR presents an added 
dimension to the extraordinarily complex constitutional entanglement presented by Brexit, 
as well as raising fundamental questions beyond the Brexit context.  
 
The paper is the product of a one-day workshop held at Edinburgh Law School on 27 
October 2016 attended by Ed Bates, Christine Bell, Christopher McCrudden, Kanstantsin 
Dzehtsiarou, Fiona de Londras, Sir David Edward, Anne Smith, Murray Hunt, Cormac Mac 
Amhlaigh, Dimitrios Kagiaros,  John Corey, Kavita Chetty, Maire McCormack, and the 
editors. The text of this paper was produced by the editors from the contributors’ oral 
                                                          
1 The Conservative Party Manifesto 2015, available at: https://s3-eu-west-
1.amazonaws.com/manifesto2015/ConservativeManifesto2015.pdf. 
2 Ibid. See in particular the section ‘Real change in our relationship with the European Union’ 72 et seq. 
3 Ibid. 60. 
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presentations and discussion, and the editors take full responsibility for the accuracy of this 
report. Where necessary, the editors have added notes or additional information to the text 
to enhance clarity or detail, or to note key developments that have taken place since the 
workshop was held.  
 
We would like to thank the Thomas Paine Initiative for their generous support, and 
Edinburgh Law School (Europa Institute and Global Justice Academy), the Bingham Centre 
for the Rule of Law, and the Human Rights Centre at Queen’s University Belfast for their 
support as co-organisers. 
 
Tobias Lock and Tom Gerald Daly 
Edinburgh, 6 February 2017 
 
 
 
 
 
tobias.lock@ed.ac.uk 
tom.daly@ed.ac.uk 
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General introduction 
 
 
On 27 October 2016 Edinburgh Law School, the Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law, the 
Global Justice Academy, the Human Rights Centre, and the Edinburgh Europa Institute came 
together at Edinburgh Law School to discuss, under the Chatham House rule, two inter-
connected developments of profound significance for the constitutional order of the United 
Kingdom: Brexit and a British Bill of Rights. Although the discussion ranged widely, human 
rights protection, and the prospect of regression in existing rights protection, was the 
primary focus. 
 
The workshop provided a useful forum for academics, civil society actors, politicians and 
other governance actors to offer and exchange their perspectives on the nature of these 
developments, and the possible implications of each development for the United Kingdom 
across a range of dimensions: the devolution settlements, the peace settlement in Northern 
Ireland based on the Good Friday Agreement, parliamentary supremacy, the UK’s 
relationship with the European Union, and the UK’s international obligations beyond the 
EU’s legal order.  
 
Overall, the workshop presented a form of mapping exercise, with successive presentations 
and round-table discussion incrementally building a picture of the ways in which Brexit and 
a British Bill of Rights relate to, and are shaped by, the expansive and multi-level 
constitutional terrain across the sub-state, UK, EU, and international levels.  
 
With twelve speakers in one day, as well as open ‘Q & A’ sessions, it is not possible to fully 
reflect the detail of the discussions. This summary of the proceedings groups conveys the 
key points arising from the discussions, grouped around four key themes:  
 Concrete reduction in rights protection; 
 Consent; 
 Constitutional complexity; and  
 Community.  
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Part I 
 
Concrete Reduction in Rights Protection 
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Introduction 
 
 
Although public discussion concerning Brexit has largely focused on the economic and 
international relations dimensions, a central additional concern is the impact of the UK’s exit 
from the EU on human rights protection within the UK. 
 
1.  Loss of rights contained in EU law 
 
Brexit clearly presents an overall reduction in the formal protection for human rights within 
the UK. Departure from the European Union (EU) means that the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights would disappear from the UK legal order, as there is currently no 
relationship in existence between the EU and a third country that would continue its 
applicability.  
 
The Charter is more limited in the scope of its application to the UK than the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), but is substantively broader. The Charter only applies 
where a public authority in the UK ‘is implementing’ EU law.  By contrast, the ECHR applies 
directly in the UK via the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) to all acts of public authorities.  
Removal of the Charter means removal of a variety of rights therein that are not protected 
by other texts in force in the UK, such as an express right to data protection, specific rights 
of the child, and social rights, as well as the more expansive protection of rights which have 
a counterpart in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).  
 
In terms of enforcement, the Charter, as a creature of EU law, requires UK Acts 
(implementing EU law) that are incompatible with its text to be disapplied by national 
courts. This follows from the primacy of EU law.4 By contrast, under the HRA, national courts 
are empowered to make solely a declaration of incompatibility where rights protection 
under UK law departs from the protection afforded by the ECHR.  
 
                                                          
4 Established early on in Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL ECLI:EU:C:1964:66. 
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Other losses in the Brexit context are the possibility to challenge EU measures from within 
the UK under the EU Charter, and the extraterritorial applicability of the Charter. Loss of the 
Charter, through Brexit, also means loss of a ‘back up’ in the event that a British Bill of 
Rights (BBR) might seek to provide narrower rights protection; namely, that such a 
retrograde move would be only partially successful insofar as the Charter would be likely to 
gain prominence and more preliminary references concerning Charter rights could be made 
to the European Court of Justice (ECJ).  
 
It was also observed that under the Great Repeal Bill Ministers are likely to be endowed 
with rather robust powers to amend legislation, and that it would be important to scrutinise 
the detail of both the primary legislation and secondary legislation enacted, which both 
intentionally and unintentionally may water down human rights protection. 
 
More broadly, it was observed that the removal of the Charter from the UK legal system 
represents a weakening of the human rights protection framework as a whole – a certain 
‘disentrenchment’ of human rights, reversing the decades-long trend toward incremental 
expansion in the right protection afforded to individuals across the UK.  
 
2.  Potential mitigation of Brexit-related rights reduction  
 
As against this, participants discussed the possibility that some elements of the remaining 
rights framework might temper these losses. These include:  
 Rights protections afforded by the common law (i.e. protections in judicial decisions, 
rather than statutory law);  
 Interpretation of the UK’s anti-discrimination laws remaining linked to ECJ 
judgments;  
 The fact that lawyers and judges will not simply ‘unlearn’ EU law overnight; and  
 The UK’s continuing obligations under other, non-EU, international human rights 
treaties (e.g. the European Convention on Human Rights, the UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child).  
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However, it was recognised that many of these protections would be weak. The first 
possibility in particular relates to ‘common law constitutionalism’ – an approach to law, 
gaining ground in recent years, which tends to support a reinvigoration of the common law 
as a primary pillar of constitutional government and a constitutional politics grounded in 
fundamental common law principles (including protection of rights under the common law), 
and which tends to accord a more central place to the courts. However, it was noted by one 
participant that common law constitutionalism, as it currently stands, does not provide 
rights protection equivalent to the rights that would be ‘lost’ through Brexit. It was also 
observed that common law constitutionalism has been a particular disappointment in 
Northern Ireland for decades, especially as far as rights protection is concerned.5  
 
As regards other rights treaties, the modalities for their enforcement are different and 
generally weaker than enforcement of EU law. There is no equivalent of the primacy and 
direct application of EU law in national orders, and the resources and powers of oversight 
bodies of many international treaties are not comparable to those of the ECJ (e.g. the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC), a body of 18 Independent experts that monitors 
domestic implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, receives periodic 
reports and issues general comments, but the UK has not ratified an optional protocol to 
permit individual complaints to the CRC).   
 
3.  Fresh impetus to a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland: A silver lining? 
 
It was observed that a ‘silver lining’ of Brexit in Northern Ireland may be the fresh impetus 
to the adoption of a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland. Such a Bill of Rights, separate from a 
British Bill of Rights, is ‘unfinished business’ from the Good Friday Agreement of 1998.6 18 
years on such a Bill of Rights has not come into being, despite a formal recommendation for 
the adoption of such a text by the NIHRC in 2008,7 and a recognition by the Commission on 
                                                          
5 See, for instance, T Cunningham, ‘Absent friends: common law constitutionalism and the Northern Ireland Bill 
of Rights debate’ (2010) 61 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 123. 
6 The text of the Good Friday Agreement is available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/136652/agreement.pdf.  
7 Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, A Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland: Advice to the Secretary of 
State for Northern Ireland 10 December 2008. Text available at: 
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a British Bill of Rights in its 2012 report that such a text should not interfere with the 
separate discussion of a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland.8  
The failure to enact such a text is largely due to a lack of political consensus. The major 
parties in the government of Northern Ireland have diametrically opposed positions: Sinn 
Féin supports the enactment of a specific Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland while the 
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) would prefer Northern Ireland to come within a British Bill 
of Rights. It was noted that the lack of political consensus to date does not augur well for an 
effective response to threats to the existing rights framework posed by Brexit, but that 
round-tables have been viewed as one way of addressing the lack of political consensus. A 
round-table was held in Belfast in 2014 at which a wide diversity of views was aired, and 
funding has been sought for further round-tables.  
 
A Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland 
 
Paragraph 4, under the heading ‘Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity’ 
in the Good Friday Agreement, tasked the Northern Ireland Human Rights 
Commission (NIHRC) with consulting and advising the UK government ‘on the 
scope for defining, in Westminster legislation, 
 
rights supplementary to those in the European Convention on Human 
Rights, to reflect the particular circumstances of Northern Ireland, drawing 
as appropriate on international instruments and experience. These 
additional rights to reflect the principles of mutual respect for the identity 
and ethos of both communities and parity of esteem, and - taken together 
with the ECHR - to constitute a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland. Among 
the issues for consideration by the Commission will be:   
  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
http://www.nihrc.org/uploads/publications/bill-of-rights-for-northern-ireland-advice-to-secretary-state-
2008.pdf.  
8 Commission on a Bill of Rights, A UK Bill of Rights? The Choice Before Us Vol.1 December 2012 paragraph 75 
and Conclusion 12.4. Text available at: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130128112038/http:/www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/about/cbr
/uk-bill-rights-vol-1.pdf.  
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    • the formulation of a general obligation on government and public 
bodies fully to respect, on the basis of equality of treatment, the identity 
and ethos of both communities in Northern Ireland; and   
  
    • a clear formulation of the rights not to be discriminated against and to 
equality of opportunity in both the public and private sectors. 
 
4.  The ‘forgotten’ all-Ireland charter of rights 
 
It was noted at the Workshop that the Good Friday Agreement also envisages discussion of 
a form of All-Ireland ‘charter’ of rights. However, this aspect of the Agreement has been 
largely ignored since 1998 and represents further ‘unfinished business’ from the Agreement.  
 
An all-Ireland Charter of Rights 
 
Paragraph 10, under the heading ‘Rights, Safeguards and Equality of 
Opportunity’ in the Good Friday Agreement, states:  
 
It is envisaged that there would be a joint committee of representatives of 
the two Human Rights Commissions, North and South, as a forum for 
consideration of human rights issues in the island of Ireland. The joint 
committee will consider, among other matters, the possibility of 
establishing a charter, open to signature by all democratic political parties, 
reflecting and endorsing agreed measures for the protection of the 
fundamental rights of everyone living in the island of Ireland. 
 
5.  The potential and pitfalls of a British Bill of Rights 
 
Regarding a separate British Bill of Rights (BBR), a key point of discussion was whether 
moving towards such a Bill of Rights represents a step toward a more mature 
constitutionalism in the UK, or whether the process would be ‘captured’ by political 
interests eager to achieve a narrowing of rights protection.  
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That question had been central to the adoption of different positions by members of the Bill 
of Rights Commission, which reported in 2012. The majority of the Commission were of the 
view that a strong argument existed in favour of adopting a UK Bill of Rights, primarily on 
the basis that it would enhance public ‘ownership’ of human rights protection and could 
provide a stronger bulwark against abuse of State power than the Human Rights Act. A 
minority of the Commission’s members, Philippe Sands and Helena Kennedy QC, had voiced 
the concern that a British Bill of Rights could set a path towards withdrawal of the UK from 
the ECHR system of rights protection and a diminution in rights protection across the UK.9  
 
At the Edinburgh workshop on 27 October, some participants pointed to the possibility that 
a British Bill of Rights could mitigate or resolve the reduction in rights protection occasioned 
by Brexit. ‘Lost’ EU Charter rights, for instance, could be included in a BBR. More widely, one 
participant emphasised that we should not fear the discussion of a BBR but embrace it, in a 
similar manner to other states, such as Norway, that have recently adopted a bill of rights 
into their constitutional system.10 In this connection, it was noted that a draft BBR has 
already been produced by Martin Howe QC, one of the members of the Commission on a 
British Bill of Rights.11   
 
Other participants voiced the strong concern that, given the likely drafters of a BBR within 
the prevailing political climate, a BBR would inevitably bring in a reduction in rights 
protection (and it was recognised, in this connection, that all human rights commissions in 
the UK are firmly opposed to any such regression in rights protection).  
 
                                                          
9 For a summary of the majority and minority positions within the Commission, see Commission on a Bill of 
Rights, A UK Bill of Rights? The Choice Before Us (n8) Ch.12 175-178. 
10 As part of the bicentennial anniversary of the Constitution of Norway in May 2014, and drawing on the ECHR 
and other major international human rights treaties, a catalogue of civil, political, economic, social, and 
cultural rights, as well as rights of the child, were added to the Constitution in a new ‘Part E’. See e.g. A 
Bårdsen, Judge of the Supreme Court of Norway, ‘Interpreting the Norwegian Bill of Rights’ Annual Seminar on 
Comparative Constitutionalism 21-22 November 2016 Faculty of Law, University of Oslo 
https://www.domstol.no/globalassets/upload/hret/artikler-og-foredrag/interpreting-the-bill-of-rights-
21112016.pdf.  
11 This draft BBR has not been published. For further details, see O Bowcott, ‘Lawyer urges release of Tories' 
proposals for British bill of rights’ The Guardian 11 May 2015 
https://www.theguardian.com/law/2015/may/11/tory-british-bill-of-rights-martin-howe-human-rights-act.   
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A number of participants also voiced doubt regarding the potential to develop the kind of 
mature, deliberative constitutional systems built up in other European states (e.g. Germany) 
in the UK around a BBR.  One key obstacle to such a development is that, unlike the single 
constitutional identity in states such as Germany (notwithstanding the federal nature of that 
state), the UK now has multiple constitutional identities; particularly the separate 
constitutional identities that have developed in Scotland and Northern Ireland since the 
devolution settlements and the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. 
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Part II 
 
Consent 
 
 
 
 20 
 
Introduction 
 
 
Regarding Brexit, the process of withdrawal from the EU is governed by Article 50 of the 
Treaty on European Union (TEU) and can be presented as five separate stages:  
 UK decision to withdraw in accordance with the UK’s constitutional requirements; 
 Notifying the European Council of the UK’s intention to withdraw; 
 Negotiation between the UK and the EU on the terms of the withdrawal; 
 If the negotiation is successful, exit takes place; 
 If the negotiation is not successful the UK will automatically leave the EU without a 
negotiated deal after two years (unless an extension is unanimously agreed by the 
27 remaining Member States). 
 
Consent was a central issue discussed at the workshop, which affects the withdrawal 
process across five inter-related dimensions: (i) the involvement of the UK Parliament in the 
Brexit negotiations; (ii) the consent of the Northern Ireland Assembly to Brexit; (iii) the 
consent of the Scottish Parliament; (iv) the need for unanimous agreement by all EU 
Member States should the UK wish to reverse the triggering of Article 50; and (v) the 
possible need to obtain the consent of the Republic of Ireland to Brexit as a fundamental 
alteration of the Good Friday Agreement.  
 
Spanning domestic law, EU law, and international law, as well as politics, all five dimensions 
speak to the same central message: the UK government does not have a free hand in its 
approach to Brexit negotiations, and will have to engage with a variety of internal and 
external actors in the Brexit process in order to ensure that the process complies with the 
UK’s existing legal and constitutional obligations, and more widely, to ensure that 
fundamental questions regarding the legitimacy of the process are adequately addressed. 
 
1.   Existing litigation concerning consent 
 
The first two consent issues listed above, concerning the UK Parliament and the Northern 
Ireland Assembly, are the subject of two different litigation processes in London and Belfast.  
 21 
 
Both cases concern the initial stage of the process of withdrawing from the EU, set out in 
Article 50 TEU.  
 
Article 50 TEU: Key provisions 
 
1. Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in 
accordance with its own constitutional requirements. 
 
2. A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the European 
Council of its intention. In the light of the guidelines provided by the 
European Council, the Union shall negotiate and conclude an agreement 
with that State, setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking 
account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union. That 
agreement shall be negotiated in accordance with Article 218(3) of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. It shall be concluded on 
behalf of the Union by the Council, acting by a qualified majority, after 
obtaining the consent of the European Parliament. 
 
3. The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date 
of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years 
after the notification referred to in paragraph 2, unless the European 
Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned, unanimously 
decides to extend this period. 
 
1.1 The London litigation: R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the 
European Union 
 
The litigation in London concerns whether the exercise of the Royal Prerogative by the UK 
government to trigger the process of leaving the EU under Article 50 of the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU) is acceptable under UK constitutional law, or whether there is a 
requirement that Parliament must be involved on the basis that the Prerogative has been 
displaced by the European Communities Act 1972.  
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Update: The High Court judgment of 3 November 2016 
 
The workshop took place before the High Court judgment of 3 November 
2016 in R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2016] 
EWHC 2768 (Admin). In this judgment, the High Court held that the triggering 
of Article 50 TEU does require the approval of Parliament. The UK government 
has appealed the decision to the UK Supreme Court, with a hearing date of 5-
8 December 2016. 
 
1.2   The Belfast litigation 
 
The Belfast litigation goes significantly beyond the London litigation. Its starting point is 
similar, in that it argues that the Royal Prerogative has been displaced by the Northern 
Ireland Act 1998, read in conjunction with the Good Friday Agreement of 1998. It is argued 
that the UK government must seek and obtain a legislative consent motion (LCM) from the 
Northern Ireland Assembly (as established, the litigants argue, by convention). In the 
alternative, it is argued that any exercise of the Royal Prerogative is constrained by various 
provisions of Northern Ireland legislation and public law, including the Northern Ireland Act.  
 
In the Belfast litigation, the arguments are both legal and political. The main legal argument 
is that if the UK government has the power to exercise the Royal Prerogative in the context 
of Brexit, this has the potential to affect the legislative capacity of the Northern Ireland 
Assembly under the Northern Ireland Act. It is argued that the consent principle is the 
central principle in the Good Friday Agreement: reflected legally through the legislative 
consent motion (LCM) required to permit the UK Parliament to enact legislation on a 
devolved issue over which the Northern Ireland Assembly has regular legislative authority. 
The Belfast litigation therefore concerns whether the courts are in a position to declare the 
existence of a convention for the use of an LCM, and whether such convention should be 
implemented (it is therefore a declaratory order, not a mandatory order).  
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As regards rights protection, the Belfast litigation argues that Brexit would affect the central 
commitment in the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) to ensuring rights protection in Northern 
Ireland equivalent to the ECHR. This is because this equivalence is achieved in Northern 
Ireland through overlapping protection provided by both the Human Rights Act 1998 and 
through EU law itself.  The overall political argument relates to the considerable concern in 
Northern Ireland that the GFA, which underpins the enduringly fragile peace settlement, will 
be weakened by Brexit and may be subjected to such strains that it will fall apart, with 
obvious implications (especially for human rights) if the conflict is renewed.  
 
One concrete example is the issue of equality legislation, which is a clear ‘flash point’ for 
discord between the main parties in the consociational government: Brexit would mean that 
more responsibility for equality legislation, where the EU is currently a dominant actor, 
would be transferred to the Northern Ireland Assembly, thereby increasing the likelihood of 
friction between the main governing parties and threatening the peace settlement itself.  
 
Update: The High Court of Northern Ireland judgment of 28 October 2016 
 
One set of litigants in Belfast received an adverse ruling from the High Court 
of Justice in Northern Ireland on 28 October, one day after the workshop. In 
Re McCord's Application [2016] NIQB 85 the High Court rejected the 
applicants’ arguments for a reading of the Good Friday Agreement holding 
that any change to the constitutional arrangements for the government of 
Northern Ireland and, in particular, UK withdrawal from the EU, can only be 
effected with the consent of the people of Northern Ireland.   
  
The text of the judgment is available at: http://bit.ly/2fN1ZXF.  
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2.  Consent of the Scottish Parliament 
 
Third, the question of issuance of an LCM was also discussed in the context of the Scottish 
Parliament, under the Scotland Act 2016 (which places the Sewel convention concerning 
consent on a statutory footing). Two possible scenarios were noted:  
(i) Westminster would proceed without seeking an LCM; or  
(ii) Westminster, having sought and failed to obtain an LCM, would nevertheless 
proceed with triggering Article 50, possibly triggering a constitutional crisis 
(which might be defined as contestation that the constitution itself cannot 
resolve.) It was also noted that a similar provision is found in the Wales Act. 
 
The Sewel convention 
 
The Sewel convention first appeared as an aspect of the Scotland Act 1998, 
which established the devolution settlement for Scotland. The Memorandum 
of Understanding (the main intergovernmental agreement) set out the 
convention as follows in para.14: 
 
The United Kingdom Parliament retains authority to legislate on any issue, 
whether devolved or not. It is ultimately for Parliament to decide what use to 
make of that power. However, the UK Government will proceed in accordance 
with the convention that the UK Parliament would not normally legislate with 
regard to devolved matters except with the agreement of the devolved 
legislature. The devolved administrations will be responsible for seeking such 
agreement as may be required for this purpose on an approach from the UK 
Government. 
 
The Scotland Act 2016 has amended section 28 of the Scotland Act 1998 by 
adding the following statement: “But it is recognised that the Parliament of 
the United Kingdom will not normally legislate with regard to devolved 
matters without the consent of the Scottish Parliament.” 
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3.  The EU law dimension to consent 
 
The fourth point regarding consent, which has been raised in the Belfast litigation, is that 
the triggering and operation of Article 50 TEU in all its stages is a matter of EU law. It is a 
treaty-based provision that the UK is authorised to initialise, but governed by EU law.  To 
date, the assumption in both the London and Belfast litigation has been that the triggering 
of Article 50 cannot be reversed, save through the unanimous agreement of all EU Member 
States.  If it were to be case that Article 50 cannot be rescinded, this implies that much of 
the implications of triggering Article 50 (e.g. a ‘hard Brexit’) would be out of the hands of 
the UK Parliament, not in terms of domestic law, but as matter of EU law. This would be a 
question for the ECJ and is not being ruled out right now. 
 
4.  Consent of the Republic of Ireland under the Good Friday Agreement 
 
A fifth, and much more tentative, potential consent issue concerning Brexit arises in the 
context of the relationship between the UK and the Republic of Ireland under the Good 
Friday Agreement, which is an international treaty registered with the United Nations (by 
the government of the Republic of Ireland).  
 
4.1  Consent of the government and people of the Republic of Ireland 
 
In the Republic of Ireland some have raised the possibility that Brexit may be so 
fundamental to the Good Friday Agreement that it requires renegotiation of the Agreement; 
essentially requiring the UK government to consult the government of Ireland before pulling 
out of the EU.12 Under the Irish Supreme Court’s Crotty judgment,13 a popular referendum 
could possibly also be needed on the basis that Brexit would alter the EU treaties (although 
this is far from clear).   
 
                                                          
12 See e.g. ‘Explainer: Why are politicians talking about a 'border poll' now?’ The Journal 20 July 2016 
http://www.thejournal.ie/border-poll-2-2885034-Jul2016/.  
13 Crotty v An Taoiseach [1987] IESC 4. The full text is available at: 
http://www.supremecourt.ie/SupremeCourt/sclibrary3.nsf/pagecurrent/9FA0AA8E8D261FC48025765C0042F
6B3?opendocument&l=en.  
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The Supreme Court of Ireland’s Crotty judgment 
 
In its landmark 1987 judgment in Crotty v An Taoiseach, concerning 
ratification of the Single European Act, the Supreme Court laid down a 
general principle that a constitutional amendment is necessary whenever 
the government wishes to ratify any EU treaty which would go beyond the 
“essential scope or objectives” of the existing EU treaties. A popular 
referendum is required for any amendment of the Constitution.   
 
4.2  The Good Friday Agreement and EU law 
 
The Good Friday Agreement may also bring EU law into play in a manner that has not yet 
been fully considered: Given that the UK will remain a member of the EU until exit is 
achieved, a question would arise – which could come before the ECJ – regarding the 
obligations on the UK to uphold an agreement with another Member State which affects EU 
law.  This point was not pursued in detail at the Workshop. 
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Part III 
 
Constitutional Complexity 
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Introduction 
 
 
As the above discussion suggests, complexity transpired as the leitmotif of the workshop. 
The existing legal and institutional framework for the protection of human rights in the UK is 
a multi-layered system that cuts across both devolved and reserved competences in the 
context of devolution, and which is based on, and affected by, international treaties which 
the United Kingdom has ratified, particularly the ECHR and the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, and the Good Friday Agreement.  
 
More broadly, discussion of both Brexit and the issue of a British Bill of Rights reveal the 
sheer complexity of the British legal order after decades of incremental changes and 
constitutional fudges. Evidently, all European legal orders have become more complex due 
to the increasing influence of Europe-wide constitutional structures, but the UK legal order 
is exceptionally complex.  
 
1.  Constitutional ignorance 
 
Despite this complexity – or perhaps because of it – it was repeatedly recognised, or 
implied, that a form of ‘constitutional illiteracy, naïveté, or arrogance’ is a key factor driving 
current policy developments in the political arena, which present constitutional questions in 
excessively simple form, and which tend to present simple solutions to perceived 
institutional problems.  
 
To date, the UK government’s approach to Brexit in particular appears to have elided the 
constitutional complexity involved; to seek to cut through the multiple Gordian knots rather 
than attempt to untangle them. Similarly, scrapping of the Human Rights Act and 
introduction of a BBR has been presented as a rather simple process. For instance, the 
Conservative Party Manifesto of 2015 states: 
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This will break the formal link between British courts and the European Court of 
Human Rights, and make our own Supreme Court the ultimate arbiter of human rights 
matters in the UK.14 
 
2.  Misconceptions underlying plans to ‘free’ the UK from the European Court 
of Human Rights through a BBR 
 
A number of general observations were made at the Workshop concerning the fundamental 
misconceptions underlying the Conservative government’s stance toward repeal of the 
Human Rights Act (HRA) and its replacement by a British Bill of Rights (BBR). Even if the HRA 
is repealed the UK would still remain under an obligation to comply with the judgments of 
the European Court of Human Rights judgments in cases where the UK is a respondent 
party. A future BBR would not remove this international obligation. In fact, it might lead to 
an increase in the number of successful applications to the Strasbourg Court, diminish the 
possibility for meaningful dialogue between the Strasbourg Court and the British courts, and 
thereby amplify rather than lessen the impact of Strasbourg case-law.  
 
It was noted that the idea that a BBR would provide a ‘shield’ against future interventions by 
the Strasbourg Court is mistaken. The idea appears to be based on the observation that in 
other states with a domestic bill of rights, such as Germany, Italy, and Russia, the courts 
have set down a doctrine maintaining that domestic constitutional law is superior to the 
ECHR as a matter of domestic law.  However, as a matter of international law, such 
doctrines do not alter the international legal obligations of these states in any way. Under 
Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties a party to a treaty cannot use 
national law to justify its failure to perform a treaty, and this rule applies to the ECHR as an 
international treaty. 
 
Ultimately, there are just two ways to avoid any legal obligations arising from judgments of 
the Strasbourg Court:  
a) amending the ECHR (which appears politically implausible); or   
b) leaving the jurisdiction of the Strasbourg Court by denouncing the ECHR.  
                                                          
14 The Conservative Party Manifesto 2015 (n1) 60. 
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3.   Additional government proposals 
 
Two specific policy proposals discussed at the Workshop further evince this ‘constitutional 
illiteracy’ and misconceptions concerning the nature of the UK’s human rights obligations 
under international treaties: 
a) reductions in the protection against extradition and deportation; and  
b) restriction of the extraterritorial application of UK human rights law.  
 
3.1   Government proposals regarding extradition and deportation 
 
Regarding the extradition of criminals, or more broadly the deportation of foreign nationals 
who have committed crimes in the UK, it was emphasised that we have no clear 
understanding of how a British Bill of Rights (BBR) would be drafted in this area: the main 
information here is restricted to pronouncements in the Conservative Party Manifesto and 
previous documents produced by the Conservative Party setting out concerns regarding the 
Human Rights Act.  
 
These documents do not contain legal analysis, and do not acknowledge that it would be 
very hard to depart from the existing rights framework in any significant way while 
remaining compliant with the ECHR. For instance, the stated Conservative policy that any 
foreign national who takes the life of another cannot rely on the right to private and family 
life under Article 8 ECHR to challenge deportation amounts to a blanket ban. Given that 
blanket bans are viewed with considerable suspicion by the European Court of Human 
Rights, such a provision could bring a BBR into conflict with the Court in Strasbourg.  
 
3.2  Government proposals to restrict extraterritorial application of ECHR to 
military activities 
 
Regarding restriction of the extraterritorial application of UK human rights law to military 
activities, the Prime Minister in her speech at the Conservative Party Conference in 
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Birmingham on 5 October 2016, stated the view that soldiers should not be under shadow 
of the ECHR in carrying out their duties:  
 
[W]e will never again – in any future conflict – let those activist, left-wing human 
rights lawyers harangue and harass the bravest of the brave – the men and women of 
Britain’s Armed Forces. 15 
 
This crystallised into a two-part proposal: that the British Bill of Rights would be deemed not 
to have extraterritorial application, and that the UK would derogate from the ECHR in every 
case of military activity abroad. While this would affect the ability of UK military members to 
claim breaches of human rights while active outside the State, the focus in the discussion 
was on the ability of civilians to challenge breaches of the ECHR by the UK military services 
acting outside of the UK.  
 
The central message arising from the Workshop was that it would not be possible to simply 
remove human rights from the equation. Even if the HRA were repealed and a cast-iron 
clause could be provided in a BBR expressly restricting application of the BBR to the State 
territory, there would be two key possible pathways to human rights re-entering the 
equation:  
 first, through judicial creativity interpreting any relevant statutory provisions; and  
 second, in the common case where the UK is acting multilaterally under a UN 
Security Council Resolution, the stock phrase that states carry out military action “in 
accordance with international obligations” could create a pathway to rights 
protection arguments, including the ECHR as a (now unincorporated) treaty. 
 
It was emphasised, in this connection, that even with the repeal of the HRA the UK would 
remain subject to the ECHR. A derogation of the nature proposed would still have to comply 
with the rules concerning derogation, with the fact that there are various non-derogable 
                                                          
15 ‘Theresa May's keynote speech at Tory conference in full’ The Independent 5 October 2016 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/theresa-may-speech-tory-conference-2016-in-full-transcript-
a7346171.html.  
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rights in the ECHR, and with the fact that even rights that can be derogated from can only be 
limited to the extent “strictly required” by the exigencies of the situation.  
The likely outcome thus would simply be that individuals might make applications for relief 
to the Strasbourg Court, either following unsuccessful domestic litigation or, depending on 
the ‘non-extraterritoriality clause’, directly to Strasbourg as there might not be any 
reasonable prospect of success in domestic remedies. Were such an application to be made, 
the Court’s jurisprudence on the extraterritorial application of the Convention suggests that 
the UK would probably be found to be liable under the ECHR as a matter of international 
law. In other words, this purported solution would not in fact address the problem as it is 
framed in current Conservative Party policy.  
 
Should this play out as predicted, the whole scenario would likely exacerbate the 
sovereigntist tensions regarding parliamentary sovereignty, and put Westminster on a 
further collision course with the Strasbourg Court. In such a situation, the only possible 
outcomes would be: 
a) amendment of the British Bill of Rights to allow it to have extraterritorial effect; 
b) refusal by the UK to comply with the Court’s judgments (under a domestic ‘rule of 
law’ argument); or 
c) withdrawal from the ECHR system itself by denouncing the Convention.  
 
4.  Implications of Brexit and these specific government proposals 
 
Should the above be the case, we would not only have a ‘Great Repeal Bill’ in the Brexit 
context, but a ‘Great Retreat’ from international human rights protection, with a shift from 
the Brighton Declaration agenda focused on a form of UK dialogue with the Strasbourg 
Court to an agenda focused on freeing the UK from the Court.  
 
Brexit, in this way, not only opens the door to withdrawal from the EU, but from the wider 
system of rights supervision centred on the ECHR.16 For some participants, this reflects the 
                                                          
16 See media reports from December 2016 that the Conservative Party will include ECHR withdrawal in its next 
election manifesto, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/12/28/theresa-may-fight-2020-election-plans-
take-britain-european/.  
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overall position of a government that is not only engaged in political calculations as to 
whether submission to external European human rights supervision is ‘worth it’ on balance, 
but a government that does not wish to deal with constraints of any nature on its power, 
which is provoking a real ‘rule of law’ crisis.  
 
In this connection, it was noted that UK withdrawal from the ECHR system would be likely to 
lead to withdrawal from the Council of Europe, which would significantly undermine the 
UK’s reputation as a state that cares about human rights protection. The UK would be only 
the second country in Europe which is not a member of the Council of Europe; the other 
being Belarus with its very problematic human rights record. Withdrawal of the UK would 
also be the first time a long-established Western democracy has left a major international 
human rights regime.17 Such a move would place the UK in the company of Greece under 
military rule in December 1969, when it left the ECHR system and Council of Europe, or 
more recently, Venezuela under Hugo Chávez, which denounced the American Convention 
on Human Rights in 2012 in order to leave the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights.  
 
5.  Other significant questions raised at the Workshop 
 
Other questions raised at the workshop, which further underscore the constitutional 
complexity surrounding Brexit and a BBR included:   
 How will the government’s Brexit proposals address the reality of acquired (EU) 
rights? (this could arise in, for instance, the significant damage caused by Brexit to 
commercial interests).  
 Does the Westminster Parliament have the organisational capacity to effectively 
oversee the Brexit process? (it was noted, for instance, that it has a much smaller 
cohort of legal advisors than government).  
                                                          
17 Of course it should be noted that withdrawal from the ECHR would not relieve the UK of its obligations 
resulting from other human rights treaties, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or 
the United Nations Convention Against Torture. 
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 Would a British Bill of Rights necessarily be accompanied by repeal of the HRA? (the 
Republic of Ireland, which has both a constitutional bill of rights and a Human Rights 
Act, suggests that the two are not necessarily incompatible).  
 How can we attempt to address the real problem of a ‘democratic deficit’ in the 
context of rights supervision, without resorting to simplistic solutions?  
 If the people are to be viewed as key constitutional actors, how do we address 
significant problems concerning knowledge of, and widespread misperceptions of, 
human rights and the constitution more broadly?  
 How do human rights defenders address, in particular, the sense of alienation felt by 
individuals toward human rights, and the problem that ‘human rights’ itself has 
become a problematic, even toxic, term? 
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Part IV 
  
Community 
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Introduction 
 
 
Finally, if consent relates to the need for Brexit negotiations in particular to incorporate the 
interests of Northern Ireland, and the other nations of the UK, ‘community’ as a term is used 
here to denote the wider implications of Brexit and a British Bill of Rights for the European 
community beyond the boundaries of the UK. 
 
1.  Brexit and the wider context of EU Member States 
 
As regards Brexit, participants noted the broader European context that this is the first time 
Article 50 TEU will be (or might be) triggered. In the event that legal issues concerning Brexit 
comes before the ECJ for judgment, that Court will not address such issues solely insofar as 
they relate to the UK.  
 
Rather, with the rise of populism and calls for ‘exit’ in states such as France and the 
Netherlands, the ECJ will likely take a contextual approach that addresses these risks. In 
other words, should issues of EU law come before the ECJ in the context of the Brexit 
process, the Court will not decide the issue solely on the basis of how EU law relates to the 
UK’s legal and political order. 
 
2.  The wider implications of withdrawal from the ECHR on the UK’s neighbours 
 
As regards a British Bill of Rights, it was recognised at the workshop that although Brexit is 
very unlikely to lead to a collapse of the EU, there is a real risk that UK withdrawal from 
ECHR system could lead to the collapse of that system, by triggering a rush for the exit by 
other states, such as Russia and Azerbaijan, whose governments may welcome the excuse 
to remove the strongest tier of European supervision impeding policy formation and 
implementation.18 There is some evidence that existing UK backlash against the Court has 
                                                          
18 Currently all 47 member states of the Council of Europe are subject to the European Court of Human Rights: 
Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Republic of Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, 
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already encouraged these countries to take a more hostile attitude towards the European 
Court of Human Rights.19 
 
Therefore, even in the positive scenario that a BBR provides rights protection equivalent to 
the ECHR, or even more extensive protection, if this is accompanied by UK withdrawal from 
the ECHR system it may have significant consequences for rights protection in other states 
(notwithstanding the fact that many states do not fully comply with Strasbourg Court 
judgments).  
 
Participants noted that the purpose of the ECHR system is to provide a collective defence of 
rights, and that the current tendency to view the value of adherence to the ECHR in cold, 
transactional terms does not reflect its original purpose. 
 
3.  Conclusion 
 
A number of preliminary conclusions could be drawn from the Workshop: the clear risk of a 
regression in rights reduction in the context of Brexit and a BBR; significant questions 
surrounding the search for a more democratically legitimate approach to rights protection; 
and the real wider threats posed by current developments: to the fragile peace in Northern 
Ireland; and to the rights protection (albeit limited) provided by the ECHR system in other 
European states.  
 
The most fundamental conclusion from the workshop is that the current governmental 
approach to Brexit and a British Bill of Rights does not adequately appreciate, or address, 
the extraordinary complexity of human rights protection in the UK, which enmeshes 
protections across the international, EU, State, devolved, and bilateral planes. Until, and 
unless, policy formation begins to fully grapple with this complexity, serious rule of law and 
legitimacy questions will hang over the solutions presented by the Conservative government 
to the current constitutional entanglement. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, “The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, Turkey, Ukraine, and United Kingdom..  
19 P Leach and A Donald, ‘Russia Defies Strasbourg: Is Contagion Spreading?’ EJIL Talk 19 December 2015. 
Available at http://www.ejiltalk.org/author/leachdonald/.  
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Addendum 1 
 
The Supreme Court’s Decision in Miller 
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On 24 January 2017 – after the drafting of this report – the Supreme Court handed down its 
decision in the joined appeal against the judgments of the English and Welsh High Court in 
Miller and of the Northern Irish High Court in McCord.20  It upheld the judgment of the High 
Court by requiring that Parliament passes an Act authorising the Government to notify the 
UK’s intention to withdraw from the European Union under Article 50 TEU.  It dismissed the 
appeal against the Northern Irish judgment – as well as similar arguments advanced by the 
Scottish Government before the Supreme Court – that the consent of the devolved 
legislatures was necessary as well.   
As far as the operation of the Sewel Convention was concerned, the Supreme Court drew a 
dividing line between political conventions and questions of law.  While it recognised that 
the former can play a fundamental role in the operation of the constitution, the fact 
remains that they are not law and there compliance with them cannot be the subject of 
judicial review.  Judges are mere observers of conventions, but neither their parents nor 
their guardians.  The fact that the Sewel Convention had been placed on statutory footing 
did not change this finding since – according to the Supreme Court – it was the purpose of 
its legislative recognition to entrench it as a convention only.  The Supreme Court dismissed 
a further Northern Ireland-specific argument that the consent of the people of Northern 
Ireland was required to take Northern Ireland out of the EU based on Article 1 of the 
Northern Ireland Act 1998, which says that Northern Ireland shall not cease to be a part of 
the UK without the consent of the people. 
The Supreme Court’s judgment brought to the fore some of the constitutional complexities 
highlighted in this paper.  Importantly, it did not resolve the issues of consent identified. 
Instead these questions were left unresolved – and perhaps even unresolvable – with the 
Supreme Court holding that neither it nor any other court was competent to decide on the 
operation of the Sewel Convention.  This confines the question of consent to the sphere of 
politics without anybody of making an authoritative decision in this regard. 
 
The editors 
3 February 2017 
                                                          
20 R (on the application of Miller and another) (Respondents) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European 
Union (Appellant) [2017] UKSC 5. 
 41 
 
Addendum 2 
 
UK Withdrawal from the ECHR 
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It is worth noting that, since the workshop was held in October 2016, reports emerged in 
December 2016 that the UK Prime Minister, Theresa May, plans to make withdrawal from 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) a central campaign pledge for the 
General Election of 2020.21 The Prime Minister had previously dropped calls for such 
withdrawal as part of her campaign for leadership of the Conservative Party in Summer 
2016, but had been a vocal opponent of the Convention for some time. For instance, in April 
2016, when she was still Home Secretary, she stated: 
 
The [Convention] can bind the hands of parliament, adds nothing to our prosperity, 
makes us less secure by preventing the deportation of dangerous foreign nationals, 
and does nothing to change the attitudes of governments like Russia’s when it comes 
to human rights.22 
 
The editors 
3 February 2017 
 
                                                          
21  See W Worley, ‘Theresa May ‘will campaign to leave the European Convention on Human Rights in 2020 
election’’ The Independent 30 December 2016 www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/theresa-may-
campaign-leave-european-convention-on-human-rights-2020-general-election-brexit-a7499951.html.    
22 Home Secretary’s speech on the UK, EU and our place in the world (Archived), 25 April 2016  
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/home-secretarys-speech-on-the-uk-eu-and-our-place-in-the-
world.  
